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1 Introduction
It is hard to conceive of violence that is not
‘identity-based’, for violence results when basic
ideas of humanity are withdrawn or withheld, the
victims ‘identified’ as dangerous, irrelevant, not
belonging or not warranting care. At a societal
level, structural violence is perpetuated through
neglect, injustice, slow starvation, humiliation,
lack of recognition, summed up in broad terms
like exclusion, marginalisation, and most
recently, being ‘superfluous’. This kind of
violence has been entangled with essentialisms
and politics of identity when justifying why some
people remain disqualified or subjected to
symbolic violence. Earlier discourses blamed the
victim on the grounds of lack of civilisation,
being of inferior race, being women, or having
been colonised. Later, the rationale of
inclusion/exclusion translated and fractured into
‘identities’ of ethnicity, indigenousness, gender,
religion, political ideology, nationality, as well as
‘poverty’. Structural violence does not only lead
to reactions against an iniquitous system; more
often exclusion translates into domestic violence
and violence against those who, though not
unlike oneself, are considered different in some
essential way. Violence defies easy
categorisation. Acts of violence are mediated by
how they are perceived, where one finds in the
eye of the beholder a dichotomy between what is
legitimate and illegitimate, permissible and
sanctioned. Violence is ‘a slippery concept – non-
linear, productive, destructive, and reproductive.
It is mimetic … so we can rightly speak of chains,
spirals, and mirrors of violence’ (Scheper-Hughes
and Bourgois 2004), a continuum of violence.
This is one lens through which identity politics,
violence and (in)security can be approached. But
I want to juxtapose it with another line of
thought. This underlines important distinctions
in the way violence is labelled by beholders (we
look through different lenses) and how it is
framed by those actively engaging in and
responding to violent situations.
Not long ago, the political language in which
violence was couched was very different. There
was some consensus between beholder and
activist that repressive regimes, whether colonial
or national, would some day provoke a
revolutionary challenge. Revolution was often
depicted as glorious and inevitable, the best way
to achieve national liberation in the context of
anti-colonial or socialist struggles. Later, armed
54
Violence, Identity and (In)security:
Experiencing the Maoist Insurgency
in Peru
Fiona Wilson
Abstract This article argues that the position of political violence in developing countries has changed in the
post-Cold War period, from being seen (by some) as a legitimate response to dictatorship to become
associated with criminality and delinquency on the one hand and terrorism on the other. This provides a new
context for ‘identity politics’, the definition of which has tended to become narrower and in practice more
restrictive, leading to a hardening of ‘community’ boundaries. Taking the Maoist insurgency in Peru as a case
study, the article enquires how identity, violence and security have been lived and understood by people in
the Andean region. At the centre is an emblematic narrative of an indigenous schoolteacher who explores
connections between his experiences of Peru’s agrarian and education reforms, early support and later
rejection of political violence, and the way his community envisioned and practised security in response.
IDS Bulletin Volume 40  Number 2  March 2009   © 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
2AbelloColak40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:18  Page 54
insurrection continued to be celebrated as the
means to achieve social justice for the mass of
peasants and workers who remained trapped in
poverty and exploited by foreign capitalist
classes and traitorous local elites. Class struggle
aiming at a socialist future was projected
through political ideology, and the emancipation
it would bring conceived as a collective as well as
individual trajectory. The excluded and
marginalised would be empowered to break free
of their chains, so as to become the makers of
their own destinies. Their violence was judged
legitimate and their struggles supported
internationally, not only by some states but also
by intellectuals and solidarity groups on ‘the
left’. The message spread that against
dictatorships and repressive regimes, as found in
virtually the whole of Latin America in the
1970s, violence was considered permissible by
righteous revolutionaries. The term ‘guerrilla’
indicated the existence of political organisations
dedicated to social revolution, infused with an
ideology of nationalism and anti-imperialism
often led by young, idealistic, urban intellectuals
(Kruijt 2008). But the subsequent failure of
revolutionary movements and their parties to
inaugurate positive change and the disillusion
that followed altered the way political violence
was perceived both by beholders and by those
intent on practicing it.
In post-Cold War western discourse,
globalisation, free markets and cutting back of
state power were placed in an ideological context
of human rights, ‘politics of identity’ and
‘security’ that changed the assessment and
associations of legitimate violence. As Kaldor
and Luckham (2001) argue, the shift from
ideological or politically driven violence to
identity-based violence was one of the critical
distinguishing features of the ‘new’ wars.
Henceforth, political violence tended to become
passé among intellectuals ‘even if actively
practiced by millions of desperately angry people
across the globe’ (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois
2004). Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois claim we
are now witnessing a transition from political
violence to ‘the anomie of delinquent violence in
the neo-liberal social order’, associated with
criminality and interpersonal violence on the one
hand and an across-the-board labelling of
political violence as ‘terrorism’ on the other. To
take the dramatic case of El Salvador, the peace
settlement signed with the FMLN guerrilla
movement and end of civil war brought not an
end to violence, only a change in its character
with the welling-up of gang warfare and criminal
activity, giving the country the reputation of
being the most violent in the most violent
continent on earth.
In the maelstrom of transition from political
violence to criminality and ‘anomie of delinquent
violence’, it is not easy to distinguish between
relabelling and more substantive changes in the
nature and framing of violence through complex
connections with globalisation, neoliberalism,
free markets and lack of state regulatory power.
Changing nomenclature impedes analysis.
Blanket charges of terrorism obscure what can
be important differences as well as continuities
with political violence. Moving the concept
‘politics of identity’ to centre stage and placing it
in new contexts of terrorism and security also
misleads. As in the case of violence, in the
labelling and framing of identity politics one can
remark a tendency towards narrower, less
nuanced, definitions. Earlier, an important
aspect of overarching identity at national level
was famously expressed by Anderson as the
‘imagined’ community, the ‘community of
anonymity’, brought into existence primarily by
the spread of literacy and print capitalism.
However, it has also been argued that the
national community as imagined and
represented in public discourse offered little
room for conceptualising heterogeneity,
contestation and fracturing of national identity
(Wade 2000). For example, though idealised
renderings of peasant culture might find a place
in overarching national culture, this did not
suffice to ‘stitch up’ the existing heterogeneity
and difference. This led to a central,
destabilising, paradox. The supposedly
homogenous ‘nation’ was divided not only by
enduring hierarchies of class, race and culture,
but also was constituted by a ‘country of regions’
given different weight in the overall ensemble.
Thus in the imagined geography of Peru, the
Andean region was depicted as indigenous,
uncivilised and backward, in contrast to the
modernising white-mestizo coast.
Recently, as Geschiere and Meyer (1998) remind
us, it is not accidental that ‘identity’ has emerged
as the central concept when trying to grasp how
globalisation is reinforcing the production of
cultural difference. In current usage, ‘identity’
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marks an attempt to fix boundaries in the
ongoing flux of globalisation processes, while at
the same time registering nostalgia for a time
when it seemed possible to isolate bounded social
formations. With globalisation, new associations
have been given to the ‘politics of identity’ that
tend to reassert the local, meaning localised
communal feelings that were supposedly
suppressed in processes of state formation.
Identity politics now tends to signal a hardening
of boundaries, in which narrowly defined
‘communities’ are constructed. The claim of
shared identity is used to justify separation and
to forget earlier times when boundaries mattered
less and were more permeable, and when there
was greater belief in broader-based ‘imagined’
communities.
These tendencies have manifold implications for
the way the concept and aspiration of human
security is understood and practised when we
look from below. Here one finds a disturbing
picture emerging. If a hardening of national/
social/community boundaries is taking place at
the local level and is coupled with the belief that
separation on the grounds of shared ‘identity’ is
necessary to ensure security, then the
consequences at a broader societal level are
disastrous. For fragmentation is antithetical to
ever achieving ‘security for all’. But how is this
playing out in practice? By taking a case study, I
want to explore how violence and identity can be
connected and how people living with violence
are able to manage their security.
2 Living with political violence
My aim is to focus on local interpretations of
security in the context of political violence in
Andean Peru. In the recent civil war, the
Communist Party of Peru, Sendero Luminoso,
adopted a strategy of terror to bludgeon country
people into supporting its fight to bring down the
state. In retaliation, the state used extreme
brutality to subdue the Maoist-led insurgency.
The result was ferocious spirals of violence, rapid
descent into a ‘culture of impunity’ and the worst
human rights’ abuse at the time in the continent.
The Peruvian military portrayed the insurgency
in racist terms, stereotyping perpetrators as
untrustworthy racial half-castes and the masses
they led as violent, uncivilised Indians from the
backward Andean region. Peru’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission has acknowledged
the racism shaping the inequalities of Peruvian
society. The narrative of national identity, the
imagined community that could bring Peruvians
together, was badly flawed. Drinot comments: 
The Report laid bare the rotten pillars of
Peruvian society like no other analysis,
pointing to the ‘normalised ideas and
behaviour’ that underpinned the violent
actions of Sendero Luminoso and of the armed
forces and the indifference of Peru’s ‘included’
few to the predicament of the ‘excluded’
many. (Drinot 2006) 
Indicative of this was the Commission’s finding
that some 70,000 Peruvians had suffered violent
deaths, double the number previously estimated,
just over half at the hands of Sendero and just
under half at the hands of the military. The vast
majority of those who died were Quechua-
speakers from the Andean region. How was it,
asked critical voices, that in the Peruvian nation
so many deaths had taken place unnoticed?
Instead of summarising the antecedents and
history of the insurgency from when armed
struggle began in 1980 until 2003 when the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission delivered its
Report, I want to trace what political violence and
security meant in personal terms. How were
these issues lived and portrayed? Before this, I
shall comment on methodology and the
ambiguity of political violence in the case of Peru.
2.1 Researching violence and security
In many contemporary studies in the
development/security field, one finds that the
social actor has receded from view. Individuals
appear as ciphers; perhaps a name is attached to
a quotation or testimonial, but these are neither
framed nor contextualised. The sound bites tend
to be predictable, and almost always spoken from
the position of the innocent, or the witness.
Respondents seem to follow an agreed script;
they reflect an agreed standpoint rather than a
personal view. This provides few insights for the
researcher to work with. For the more one
becomes involved in everyday life, in the lived
‘realities’ of insurgencies, civil wars and ‘post-
conflict’ aftermath, the messier and more
ambiguous the picture becomes. It does not help
our understanding if complexity is brushed aside
through recourse to simplification and
stereotyping, or the acceptance of standard
binaries (like included/excluded, perpetrators/
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victims). It becomes impossible at the level of
everyday life to draw definitive distinctions
between those who act violently, those targeted
as recipients of violence, and those who are
innocent bystanders or just caught in the middle.
Only slowly do complexities come to light, and
anomalies emerge.
Representing people and accounting for their
actions raise a host of ethical questions. These
are especially intense in polarised, politicised,
conflict situations where claiming or denying an
‘identity’ or an action (such as killing, raping or
being raped) can be a matter of life and death.
Research into violence demands a methodology
that is reflexive, dialogic, and open-ended, that is
sensitive and respectful to what can and should
not be talked about. As Theidon records, in their
eagerness to document instances of rape by the
military in the Andean region of Ayacucho, some
researchers believed they had the right to
override the indigenous women’s request to let
them forget, urging that it was better for them to
talk it out (Theidon 2007). ‘Research’ easily
becomes intrusive and extractive, especially for
acutely vulnerable people for whom the
researcher has little to offer in return.
In the turbulent Central Peruvian Andes of the
1990s which I revisited in the mid-1990s, after an
absence of 20 years, I chose to work primarily
with schoolteachers, both those who supported
and those who opposed Sendero. Many teachers
were articulate, keen to reflect on their
experiences and gave insightful comments on
the wider picture. I focused my enquiry partly on
what had occurred in the town, and partly on the
situation in rural areas,1 some communities
having ‘resisted’ and others, as alleged by the
military, having collaborated with Sendero. In
the dualistic, polarising terminology
characteristic of times of conflict, the choice lay
between resistance and subversion, there being
no possible ‘middle ground’.
2.2 From political violence to delinquency
Although extremist in its political ideology and
excessively violent in its political practice, at the
beginning, Sendero Luminoso modelled itself on
the guerrilla. As elsewhere in Latin America, the
political message was expressed in a language of
class oppositions with the corrupt state
considered the enemy. Political doctrine centred
on reviving popular nationalism through
disentangling the rotten state from the people;
glorification of armed struggle; belief in a social
order brought through force; and a vaguely
specified utopia of a perfect society ‘of great
harmony’. For those engaging with the party
there were also more tangible aspirations,
release from a disdained marginalised social
position as ‘cholos’ or half-castes, and the
possibility of leading and influencing after the
armed struggle had toppled the old regime and
installed an egalitarian order in which everybody
would be the same.
Sendero had long been linked to the education
sector. Its founders were lecturers at the new
university of Huamanga in the Andean town of
Ayacucho, led by philosophy professor, Abimael
Guzman. In the contests between Maoist
factions, Sendero failed to take control of
popular and peasant organisations, but
continued to dominate the education programme
at the university and branch of the teachers’
union. The party spread by enrolling recruits
through networks of schoolteachers, students
and graduates from provincial universities. In
later years, some 30,000 teachers (15 per cent of
all teachers) were estimated to be actively
supporting Sendero, acting as ‘eyes and ears’ of
the party throughout the country.2
The association of Sendero with the education
sector went deeper. Peruvian analysts argue that
the authoritarianism, symbolic violence and
everyday humiliation found in Peruvian schools
were mirrored by the authoritarian
organisational structure of the party (Ansión
1989; Degregori 1991). Sendero played on the
mission and vocation of the schoolteacher, a
figure who should be vested with authority,
bringing civilisation and eradicating superstition
from the backward classes. Through
intransigence and ruthlessness, the party
displaced rival factions and focused its mobilising
and recruiting activities on the young in
secondary and higher education. Their idealism
and hunger for retribution was channelled into
political violence to overthrow the racist system
responsible for marginalising them. But political
violence and criminal/delinquent violence soon
blurred. Sendero’s tactics of using terror against
the indigenous peasantry and growing tendency
to murder ‘dissidents’ from its own ranks,
destroyed whatever claim the party might once
have had to be promoting ‘legitimate violence’ in
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a just revolutionary cause. To elaborate on this, I
shall refer to my fieldwork material from the
province in Tarma in the Central Andean region.
2.3 Narrating violence and security in Tarma province
Sendero ideologues had been proselytising in the
Central Andean province of Tarma since the
early 1970s. Initially they had met with little
success. Activists made their presence felt by
throwing home-made bombs, attacking district
police stations, hoisting the hammer and sickle
flag in public places, and writing ugly graffiti on
walls. Party presence became more intense once
cadres had infiltrated the local telephone
exchange, taken over schools in the rural
periphery and ousted political rivals running
social welfare programmes. In this region,
violence reached a crescendo in the period
1989–92, diminishing abruptly after Abimael
Guzman was captured in Lima. The aftershocks
were palpable when I returned to Tarma in 1994.
Over the next few years in intermittent periods
of fieldwork, I talked to some 60 teachers about
what had happened to them. Convinced Maoists
tended to talk impersonally, in slogans. Most
eloquent were teachers who had been on the
fringes of Sendero, who acknowledged the party’s
early appeal and fascination, followed by their
disillusion and repudiation of the party’s cold
calculating violence that broke all acceptable
norms. I have selected one emblematic account
by a rural teacher of indigenous parentage, who
in a graphic way illustrates people’s responses to
violence and ways of framing these, their lived
‘politics of identity’, and reasons for supporting
and then rejecting Sendero as the party moved
into delinquent and criminal violence.
Living identity, violence and security: a rural teacher’s
account:
Antonio Quispe was born and brought up on
hacienda Maco in the highland periphery of
Tarma.3 As a child he had attended the tiny
primary school located at a distance from the
settlement that taught up to third grade. His
teacher he remembered as ‘white’. He had been
rough with the children, hitting them until they
learnt, and taught through a militaristic
pedagogy of marching and bodily discipline. But
the children had benefited, Antonio reflected, as
they had been slow and timid; boys learnt to hold
their heads up high and shout like men. In the
enclosed world of the hacienda, children had been
submissive because parents had implanted fear
of the supernatural. As Antonio later came to
realise, peasant superstition had suited the
hacendados well, for it had stopped them from
learning ‘the truth’ and reflecting on the reasons
for their slavery and exploitation.
Antonio was obliged to work for the hacienda
when he turned 14 years of age. But then came
the Agrarian and Education Reforms instigated
by the military government of Juan Velasco
Alvarado (1969–75) and this brought freedom.
Though Maco’s owners had been unusually
resourceful in modernising agriculture and
livestock production, the organisation of
production was still based on servile labour
relations.4 The old ‘feudal’ system was now swept
away, and in its place a cooperative founded. In
1970, of the 122 heads of household who became
socios (cooperative members), 37 had been unable
to sign their names on official documents. At the
insistence of the Agrarian Reform office, an
administrator was appointed, a white ingeniero
agronomo (agricultural engineer) from the coast
who was inexperienced in Andean agriculture
and abusive of hacienda Indians. On my first visit
to Maco in the mid-1970s, I remember the
ridiculing and joking about the administrator
that went on behind his back. Thanks to the
state’s education reforms, Antonio had been able
to attend secondary school in a district capital a
couple of hours’ walk away. Finishing school in
1978, he was immediately appointed as a teacher
in a large, well-built school on the central square,
the pride of the community. There he joined
three urban, mestizo teachers, teaching 54
enrolled children. As the only Quechua speaker,
Antonio felt it his duty to despertar a la gente
(awaken the people). Before long the urban
teachers left and Antonio became headmaster.
During the military government, the state had
appeared to listen to the claims and wishes of the
indigenous peasantry. But this ended abruptly in
the late 1970s when the state increasingly
adopted the ideology of neoliberalism.
Antonio’s political militancy was first channelled
into struggles in the cooperative, the conflict
between socios and administrator. The
administrator left. But in 1982 the cooperative
was bankrupt, unable to pay the teachers’
salaries and Antonio left to look for teaching
posts elsewhere in Tarma province. There he
came into contact with revolutionary Maoism
and the belligerent political message of the
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teachers’ union. He found the class-based
analysis of Peru’s inequality put forward by the
Maoists enlightening, and recognised how he had
suffered first-hand the abuse of the hacienda
system. With other Quechua-speaking teachers,
he developed a hybrid political language where
an Andean imagery of darkness and light, being
blind then seeing, being ignorant then
enlightened, and going through physical
suffering in order to learn, was interwoven with
Maoist doctrine of class-based exploitation
learnt from Marxist manuals available in the
towns. Teachers fashioned a discourse on power,
violence and retribution, giving fellow comuneros
emotive concepts through which to apprehend
and make sense of the past.
Although Antonio won respect as leader and
defender of his community, he felt he had been
denied the authority due to a teacher on grounds
of race. Proof, in his eyes, was that he had never
managed to complete a university degree (in
education) begun 20 years before. The
conclusion he drew was that even the educated
from ex-haciendas and indigenous communities
were treated as second-class citizens; they were
cholos, a derogatory term coined by a racist
external world. A phrase used by Antonio and
many others teaching in their home
communities was: ‘you can never be a prophet in
your own land’ – their familiarity with and
embeddedness in peasant ways meant they could
achieve neither authority nor social mobility. But
the promise held out by Sendero was that by
joining the party and espousing its ruthless
doctrine, they could.
At first, Antonio was greatly impressed by
Sendero and its intellectual leader, Guzman. He
accepted that the revolutionary struggle had
been launched on behalf of poor people like
himself. The first party cadres who showed up on
Maco he found worthy of respect. They were
well-educated, spoke perfect Spanish, knew the
region, seemed to care about children’s welfare;
in sum, they conducted themselves like
benevolent urban teachers. He was tempted to
join them, for he identified with their message of
social justice and a new political order swept
clean of dirt and corruption. But he did not. In
hindsight, he rationalised that he could not leave
his suffering community. Like the majority of
rural communities, the people of Maco chose a
strategy of coexistence; they would wait and see
what Sendero cadres offered. A few years later,
sympathy for Sendero evaporated. Antonio
moved from supporter to witness and then to
opponent on account of the violent incursions,
executions and material destruction in an
adjacent community. On Maco, Sendero forces
arrived in ever-greater numbers, sometimes
more than 60 at a time. They demanded food
and ransacked the health post. They harangued
people for hours demanding they block roads and
blow up bridges to stop the military from
entering the valley (this being an important
north–south routeway for Sendero cadres). They
maltreated Antonio, accusing him of being an
informer.
Cautiously, Antonio and other community
leaders organised resistance. But this was tricky,
as they could not tell who supported Sendero,
especially among the young men returning from
secondary school in the towns who were no
longer submissive towards their fathers. The
leaders adopted a tactics of mobility, keeping on
the move and sleeping in different houses. In
1991, in an attempt to turn the tide against the
insurgency, the Government of Alberto Fujimori
offered to arm rural settlements and district
towns so the population could organise their own
defence. The contours and framing of legitimate
violence were changing once more. Antonio was
part of the delegation sent to the army base in
Tarma town to negotiate permission to form a
ronda campesina (peasant militia). The ronda was in
full swing when I went back to Maco in the mid-
1990s (Ronsbo 2006).
Every night the ronda patrolled the perimeter of
the settlement, guns in hand. They captured a
few delincuentes who were handed over to the
military base as suspected senderistas; they also
captured rustlers and trespassers who they
roughed up. But the most serious threat at the
messy end of the insurgency was from pishtacos.
For many Andeans, pishtacos are supernatural
beings who are always around, but at times of
insecurity they take human form, becoming
embodied as male Europeans who, nowadays,
carry backpacks stuffed with knives and glass
jars. On the periphery of community, between
the wild and the civilised, pishtacos wait for young
indigenous women, put them in a trance and
using their knives cut out their fat. The fate of
the women was to eventually weaken and die. In
colonial times, the fat collected made Church
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candles; in the 1940s, it greased machinery of US
mining companies; and in the 1980s, it went to
pay the external debt. In 1994, rumours spread
that pishtacos were increasing in numbers and
force, for the military had issued them with
licences and motorbikes. Leaders of the ronda
went to Lima, demanded to see a high-ranking
military officer who, bemused, assured the angry
men that the military had no intention of
licensing anybody to commit acts of violence!
Marking the transition from conflict to ‘post-
conflict’, this military (like others) attempted to
change its image, from bringing death to
safeguarding life (the shift ‘from guns to beans’).
But in the spirals and chains of mimetic violence,
this was not immediately apparent.
The pishtaco story provides a clue as to local
interpretations of security. First, pishtacos
represent a powerful metaphor of the inherent
dangers of the external world, when white men
seek to destroy the community’s most precious
asset, young women of reproductive age. Second,
sharing stories of pishtacos was a way of
unburdening fear, talking in a mode, which
avoided mentioning military or Maoists. The
incidence of pishtaco sightings and rapid
circulation of stories gave an indication as to the
fever pitch of fear. Third, by organising and
arming a ronda, men demonstrated their virility
and ability to defend their families and
community against a supernatural threat, more
powerful even than Sendero.
Living with political violence and insecurity:
Accounts of teachers who allegedly were
complicit with Sendero and therefore labelled as
subversives follow a similar pattern to Antonio’s.
They had been exposed when young to the class
message of Maoism, were idealistic, searched for
social justice, and felt a responsibility to ‘do
something’ for themselves and their community.
But there were also differences. Antonio’s
account suggests that those who came to reject
Sendero put belonging, the flesh and blood ties
of kinship, before abstract ideas of revolution
and the cold emotion required if one was to
‘cross the river of blood’ as senderistas called
indoctrination into political violence. It sounds
almost banal that Antonio stuck to a cooperative
doomed to failure rather than leave to bring
down the state. Teachers who remained with the
Maoist party tended to have been sent away for
secondary education at a very young age. This
dislocation meant they had not taken on
positions of authority in the community and
developed a more distanced, often nostalgic, idea
of home. Teachers from communities unable to
resist the onslaught of Sendero or military found
themselves in the most dangerous position, as
outsiders or ‘tricksters’ who moved their
allegiance between the revolutionary alternative
and repressive forces of the state. They
manoeuvred in polarised fields in which they had
to identify themselves as being ‘for’ or ‘against’
the insurgency, and therefore ‘for’ or ‘against’
the state. However, their encounters with
violence and attempts at finding security meant
in practice they transgressed distinctions of
victim and perpetrator, and confounded
stereotypes of political ‘identity’.
Clearly, those communities which established
rondas campesinas could provide better security
than those who could not. But the spread of
militias patrolling community boundaries
indicated a hardening of boundaries as well as a
shift in communal organisation that meant
giving greater emphasis to masculine heroism,
reinforcement of patriarchal relations and
homogenising of narratives about the war. This
brought contradictory implications with respect
to relations in the communities themselves
(Theidon 2003). The situation of many other
communities was different. They were more
exposed to terror tactics and threat, especially
those in Sendero’s so-called ‘liberated’ zones,
forced to supply food and recruits, who then bore
the brunt of violent recriminations by the
military. People fled, leaving their livestock and
belongings that were then confiscated by the
military or aggressive neighbours. Displacement
and move to the relative security of the towns
changed the political as well as the social and
economic landscape of the region.
3 Afterword
In the aftermath of insurgency, authoritarianism
and corruption reached unprecedented levels in
Peru. The population continued to be held under
strict (wartime) surveillance by the Fujimori
Government; suspected unruly groups, especially
students and unionists, were hounded and their
organisations prohibited. The scandals
surrounding the Government’s gross abuse of
power, as well as its deals with drug traffickers
and arms traders finally led to Fujimori’s
downfall in 2001. Subsequently, two tendencies
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have been prominent. One is the explosion of
criminality and delinquency that has pressed
some to advocate ‘el mano duro’ (the iron hand),
whether exercised by the state or by a militarised
organisation like Sendero. The other is the
upwelling of political confrontations, with
protesters risking the label of ‘terrorist’ in an
attempt to protect their communities from the
ravages and abuses of the mining companies,
which have greatly expanded their operations in
the Andes, with full support from the Government.
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Notes
1 I employ the term ‘community’ to indicate a
rural collectivity having legal rights to land on
a collective basis and an organisational
structure to manage them. Settlements in the
community may be concentrated or dispersed.
2 This number was given by Gloria Helfer, when
Minister of Education, quoted by McClintock
(1998).
3 The name of the teacher has been changed.
4 Labour struggle on Maco had been intense in
the 1940s. For this earlier history, see Wilson
(1986).
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